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PERSONAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS IN 
EJECTMENT ACTIONS: EVOLUTION OF THE TORT 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF METROMEDIA CO. V. 
WCBM MARYLAND, INC. 
Lawrence S. Greenwaldt and Charles S. Hirschi 
Most corporate officers and dire\!tors sleep easily at night be-
lieving that if they act solely in the best interest of their corporation 
and avoid activities that would permit the piercing of the corporate 
veil, I they are insulated from personal liability for actions taken on 
behalf of the corporation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently 
sent a wake-up call to corporate officers and directors in Metromedia 
Co. v. WCBM Maryland, Inc. 2 In WCBM, the court r~affirmed a 
long held, but frequently overlooked, principle - that corporate 
officers and directors are personally liable for tortious acts that they 
commit, inspire, or in which they participate, even if performed in 
the name of the corporation. What may add an extra jolt to an 
already restless group of corporate officials is that the underlying 
cause of action in WCBM was ejectment, an action that many people 
think of as strictly possessory. This article will discuss the nature 
and evolution of ejectment as a tort, the individual liability of 
corporate officials for tortious acts, and the WCBM case. 
I. HISTORY OF EJECTMENT 
Although misconceptions exist surrounding the nature of eject-
ment, it is historically a tort action. Ejectment originated at common 
law as a form of trespass. 3 At common law, a tenant could bring 
an action for ejectment to recover damages from a person who 
wrongfully ejected him from his premises.4 Under the original form 
of an ejectment action, a plaintiff's recovery was limited to damages; 
t B.S., 1961, University of Pennsylvania; L.L.B., 1964, Harvard University; 
Partner, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, Baltimore, 
Maryland. 
:I: B.A., cum laude, 1983, University of Maryland; J.D., 1987, Georgetown 
University Law Center; Associate, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Bal-
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1. See Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 310-12, 340 
A.2d 225, 234-35 (1975) ("[T]he corporate entity will be disregarded ... to 
prevent fraud .... "). 
2. 327 Md. 514, 610 A.2d 791 (1992). . 
3. Trespass has long been recognized as a common law tort. W. PAGE KEETON 
ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 67 (5th ed. 
1984). 
4. ALLAN H. FISHER, ESSENTIALS OF MARYLAND PLEADING at 188-89 (2d ed. 1922); 
MARTIN NEWELL, NEWELL ON EJECTMENT 2 (1892). 
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he could not recover possession of the premises. S Recovery in eject-
ment actions was eventually expanded in the fifteenth century to 
include both damages and possession.6 
Even in its expanded form, ejectment was available only to 
tenants, not landowners. 7 A landowner who sought to recover pos-
session of his property had to bring "real actions" that have been 
described as involving "almost endless technicalities and subtleties."8 
In order to avoid the technicalities and subtleties associated with real 
actions, a practice developed· in which the landowner would create a 
"straw" tenant who would lease the land from the landowner; the 
straw tenant would then file an action in ejectment to oust the 
"trespasser. "9 Since the straw tenant was only a nominal plaintiff 
suing on behalf of the landowner, his recovery was limited to 
possession of the property and nominal damages. 10 In order to recover 
actual damages, II the landowner had to bring a subsequent action 
for trespass, on the theory that once the defendant was adjudged to 
be wrongfully in possession of the property, he was liable to the 
landowner for trespass damagesY 
This was the state of the common law of ejectment in England 
when it was adopted in Maryland. 13 The court of appeals discussed 
this history in one of its early ejectment cases: 
[When] the action of ejectment remained in its original 
state, and the ancient practice prevailed, the measure of the 
damages given by the jury, when the plaintiff recovered his 
term, were the profits of the land accruing during the 
tortious holding of the defendant. But as upon the intro-
duction of the modern system, the proceedings became 
altogether fictitious, and the plaintiff merely nominal, the 
damages assessed became nominal also .... It was therefore 
5. Arthur G. Sedgwick & Frederick S. Wait, The History oj the Action oj 
Ejectment in Eng/and and the United States, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 611 (1909); HARRY M. SACHS, JR., POE'S PLEADING 
AND PRACTICE § 50, at 73 (6th ed. 1970). 
6. NEWELL, supra note 4, at 7-8; SACHS supra note 5, at 73. 
7. NEWELL, supra note 4, at 7-8; SACHS supra note 5, at 73-74. 
8. NEWELL, supra note 4, at 8. 
9. SACHS, supra note 5, at 73-74. 
10. [d. at 74. 
11. The damages available were mesne profits. Mesne profits are profits occurring 
during wrongful possession, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (6th ed. 1990), or 
specifically "the rents and profits, or the value of the use and occupation of 
the real property recovered in an action of ejectment during the period the 
property has been wrongfully withheld." NEWELL, supra note 4, at 606. 
12. SACHS, supra note 5, at 74. ' 
13. Maryland explicitly adopted the common law of England as it existed on July 
4, 1776. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5 (Maryland Declaration of Rights). 
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necessary, to give another remedy, to the claimant for these 
damages. 14 
39 
Unlike a minority of states, which changed the common law of 
ejectment to permit plaintiffs to recover damages under an implied 
contract theory, IS Maryland left the essence of ejectment intact, 
although the legislature eventually simplified the action. In 1870 the 
legislature eliminated the need to use straw tenants when it enacted 
legislation that permitted a landowner to bring an action for ejectment 
in his own name. 16 In 1872, the legislature went a step further when 
it eliminated the need to bring two separate actions to recover 
possession and damages by permitting an aggrieved party to recover 
both possession and actual damages in a single action. 17 As a result 
of these changes, however, a plaintiff who files suit for ejectment 
must now pray for both possession and damages in his complaint; 
otherwise he is barred from recovering damages in a subsequent 
action.ls 
II. CURRENT STATE OF EJECTMENT 
Despite its evolution and modernization, the nature of ejectment 
as a tort remains unchanged. The statutory changes, which eliminated 
the use of straw tenants and permitted plaintiffs to recover possession 
and damages in a single action, affected only the procedure itself, 
and left untouched the principles that govern the action. 19 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly held that the damages recov-
erable in an action for ejectment are tort damages.20 The court of 
14. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1 Md. 55, 58-59 (1851) (quoting ADAMS ON E1ECTMENT 
379). 
15. NEWELL, supra note 4, at 609 (stating in 1892 that the action of ejectment "is 
no longer treated as sounding in tort, but rather as one founded upon an 
implied contract"); see, e.g., Holmes v. Davis, 19 N.Y. 488, 491-95 (1859) 
("The Revised Statutes have prescribed as the measure of damages in this class 
of cases [ejectment] the same rule which would prevail in assumpsit for use 
and occupation. The compensation is to be adjusted as upon contract, and not 
upon the footing of a tort."). 
16. SACHS, supra note 5, at 74. 
17. Id. at 74 & n.68. 
18. MD. RULE T40(4), T43; see also Strathmore Coal Mining Co. v. Bavard Coal 
& Coke Co., 139 Md. 355, 370, 116 A. 570, 575 (1921) (citing Gibbs v. Didier, 
125 Md. 486, 94 A. 100 (1916» (stating that if a plaintiff fails to recover 
damages in an ejectment action, the plaintiff is barred from recovering the 
same damages in a different suit). 
19. FISHER, supra note 4, at 189. 
20. See Strathmore Coal Mining, 139 Md. at 371, 116 A. at 575 (A plaintiff's 
"right to recover for damages suffered by him caused by the ejectment from 
and detention of the premises should be coextensive with his right to recover 
in trespass cases."). In Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Industrial Park, 261 Md. 
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appeals' treatment of damages in actions for ejectment accords with 
other states which have not altered the common law of ejectment.21 
The court of appeals reaffirmed its view of damages in actions 
for ejectment in Metromedia Company v. WCBM Mary/and, Inc. 22 
The court in WCBM stated that "[a]n occupancy rightful because 
permissive becomes tortious when a proper demand to vacate is 
ignored and it is then the occupants become trespassers and damages 
for their wrongful occupancy begin to accrue. "23 Therefore, if an 
occupier of land refuses to vacate the premises upon the lawful 
demand of the owner or landlord, the occupier becomes a trespasser, 
i.e., a tortfeasor, and is liable for tort damages. 
III. EJECTMENT PROCEDURE 
Ejectment remains a cause of action to recover" both possession 
of real property and damages resulting from the wrongful detention 
of the property. In order to prevail in an action for ejectment, a 
plaintiff must allege and prove that: (1) he has legal title to the 
property; (2) he has the right of possession; and (3) assuming damages 
are sought, he has suffered damages. 24 The damages recoverable are 
still designated as mesne profits,2S defined as the annualized value of 
the premises wrongfully withheld,26 but can include the rental value 
470, 485-86, 276 A.2d 61, 69 (1971), the court, quoting the trial judge, stated: 
"The Court recognizes that the profit of a business, in many instances, 
may be a true test of damages in litigation oj a tortious nature. The 
Court is mindful that, indeed, profits in an ejectment case such as 
this may, under some circumstances, be such as to create or cause 
profit, business profits to be a factor in the determination of damages 
Jor a wrongful invasion and continued possession oj land such as 
would give rise to an ejectment action." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
21. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Gibbs, 405 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981) (ejectment plus action for damages "now exists [as) only one single 
tort"); Falejczyk v. Meo. 176 N.E.2d 10, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (action for 
mesne profits after judgment in ejectment "springs from a trespass and a 
tortious holding"); McDonald v. Stone, 321 S.W.2d 845, 846. 850-51 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1958) (ejectment action characterized as a tort in which punitive 
damages were recoverable). 
22. 327 Md. 514, 610 A.2d 791 (1992). 
23. Id. at 519, 610 A.2d at 794 (quoting Felt v. Sligo Hills, 226 Md. 190, 196, 
172 A.2d 511, 514 (1961). 
24. Janoske v. Friend, 261 Md. 358, 364, 275 A.2d 474, 477 (1971) (citing MD. 
RULE T42(b». 
25. MD. RULE T43. 
26. Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 494, 276 A.2d 61, 73 
(1921) (quoting MARTIN NEWELL, NEWllLL ON EJECTMENT 607 (1982»; see supra 
note II and accompanying text. 
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of the premises or the profits derived by the wrongdoer from his use 
of the premises. 27 
IV. LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICIALS IN 
EJECTMENT \, 
In 1972 the Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed the liability 
of corporate officials for tortious acts committed by their corpora-
tions and stated as follows: 
The general rule is that corporate officers or agents are 
personally liable for those torts which they personally com-
mit, or which they inspire or participate in, even though 
performed in the name of an artificial body .... [T]o make 
an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the 
corporation there must have been upon his part such a 
breach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, 
the injury; he must have been a participant in the wrongful 
act. 
. . . But liability is not limited to tortious acts which 
he actually and physically commits; it extends as well to 
tortious acts which he actually brings about.28 
This has been the rule in Maryland for more than 100 years.29 
Since the refusal to vacate premises upon the lawful demand of 
the owner or landlord constitutes tortious conduct, corporate officers 
and directors are subject to personal liability for such conduct. 30 The 
principle that a corporate officer is personally liable for the tortious 
acts which he inspires the corporation to commit and the tortious 
acts of the corporation in which he participates has been applied to 
a variety of circumstances in addition to ejectment. 31 
27. See Van Ruymbeke, 261 Md. at 492-94, 276 A.2d at 72-74 (holding that 
although it is proper to measure damages by the profits derived by the 
wrongdoer, rental value is a more appropriate measure when the wrongdoer's 
profits are uncertain, speculative, or remote). 
28. Tedrow v. Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550-51,290 A.2d 799,802-03 (1972) (citations 
omitted). 
29. See Blaen Avon Coal v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 418 (1883) (a corporate officer 
can be held liable for trespass committed by corporation); see also Bart Arconti 
& Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 312, 340 A.2d 225, 235 (1975) 
(discussing the general rule that officers and directors are liable for tortious 
conduct). 
30. Metromedia Co. v. WCBM Md., Inc., 327 Md. 514, 518-22, 610 A.2d 791, 
793-95 (1992). 
31. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th 
Cir. 1975) ("lAJ director who actually votes for the commission of a tort is 
personally liable, even though the wrongful act is performed in the name of 
42 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
v. THE WCBM CASE 
Metromedia Company ("Metromedia") was the sublessee of a 
parcel of land in Owings Mills, Maryland, from which it once 
operated a radio station.32 In early 1987 Metromedia entered into an 
agreement with Magic 680, Inc. ("Magic 680") for the sale of its 
operating equipment and for the "sub-subleasing" of the premises.33 
Magic 680 subsequently defaulted on its obligations under its agree-
ment with Metromedia, and Metromedia re-entered the premises and 
repossessed the equipment.34 A receiver (the "Receiver") was ap-
pointed to preserve Magic 680's assets to satisfy the claims of its 
creditors, including Metromedia, and to maintain the broadcast li-
cense. 3S 
Following these events, Metromedia sought to find another pur-
chaser and eventually entered into negotiations with WCBM Mary-
land, Inc. ("WCBM") and its chief executive officer, Nicholas 
Mangione ("Mangione").36 These negotiations resulted in the exe-
cution of five agreements.37 Ultimately, the agreements were intended 
the corporation."); Zeman v. Lotus Heart, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D. 
Md. 1989) ("[A)gents and employees of a corporation may become jointly and 
severally liable with the corporation for torts committed by them while in the 
scope of service to the corporation. "); Fletcher v. Havre De Grace Fireworks 
Co., 229 Md. 196, 200-01, 177 A.2d 908, 910 (1962) (officers and directors of 
fireworks company personally liable for trespass if they directed, participated 
or cooperated in an 'act that wrongfully triggered explosions that damaged the 
plaintiff's property); Levi v. Schwartz, 201 Md. 575, 583-84, 95 A.2d 322, 327 
(1953) (president of development company liable for company's tortious dep-
rivation of adjacent landowner's lateral support); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. 
App. 1, 14, 494 A.2d 212, 218-19 (officer of corporation who is responsible 
for corporation's decision to fire employee may be held individually liable for 
tort of wrongful discharge), cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
32. WCBM, 327 Md. at 515, 610 A.2d at 792. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 515-16, 610 A.2d at 792. 
36. Id. at 516, 610 A.2d at 792. 
37. The parties entered into the following agreements: 
1. A "Lease Agreement" in which Metromedia leased the radio station 
equipment to the receiver of Magic 680 until February 28, 1989, or 
closing, whichever happened first. 
2. A "Sub-Sublease" in which Metromedia sub-subleased the Premises 
to the receiver of Magic 680 until February 28, 1989, or closing, 
whichever happened first. 
3. A "Consulting Agreement" in which the receiver of Magic 680 
engaged WCBM to assist the receiver in operating the radio station. 
This agreement was terminable by either party upon 72 hours written 
notice. 
4. A "Purchase Agreement" in which the receiver of Magic 680 agreed 
to sell the broadcast license and radio station equipment to WCBM. 
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to assign the broadcast license, to sell the equipment, and to grant 
a sub-sublease of the premises to WCBM.38 Under the agreements, 
the transaction was required to close no later than February 28, 
1989. If the transaction did not close by the February 28, 1989 
deadline, the agreements became null and void.39 Moreover, the 
Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") approval of the 
application to transfer the broadcast license was a condition precedent 
to closing, and therefore, if the FCC failed to approve the application 
by the February 28, 1989 deadline, the agreements became null and 
void. 40 . 
Pending FCC approval, Metromedia "sub-subleased" the prem-
ises to the Receiver, who in turn granted WCBM the right to operate 
the radio station.41 The Receiver's right to possess the· premises 
terminated upon closing, i.e., upon the FCC's approval of the license 
transfer, or February 28, 1989, whichever occurred first. 42 The FCC 
failed to approve the application to transfer the broadcast license 
prior to the February 28, 1989 deadline.43 Shortly thereafter, Metro-
media demanded that the Receiver and WCBM vacate the premises. 44 
WCBM refused to vacate the premises on the ground that it was 
entitled to remain on the premises until the FCC rendered a decision 
on the application.4s 
In October, 1989, Metromedia filed an action for ejectment 
against WCBM and its principal, Nicholas Mangione, seeking pos-
session of the premises and damages.46 At the conclusion of Metro-
media's case, the trial court granted a motion for judgment in favor 
of Mangione.47 The court stated that Metromedia failed to show that 
Mangione dealt with them as an individual during the course of the 
FCC approval of the transfer of the broadcasting license to WCBM 
was a condition precedent to its obligation to close under this agree-
ment. This agreement further provided that if closing were not con-
cluded on or before February 28, 1989, it would become null and 
void. 
5~ An "Agreement of Sub-Sublease" in which Metromedia agreed to 
SUb-sublease the Premises to WCBM concurrently with the closing 
under the Purchase Agreement. This agreement provided that if closing 
were not consummated on or before February 28, 1989, it would 
become null and void. 
[d. at 516 n.l, 610 A.2d at 792 n.1. 
38. [d. at 516, 610 A.2d at 792. 
39. See supra note 36. 
40. [d. at 515-16, 610 A.2d at 792-93. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 517, 610 A.2d at 793. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. 
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transaction; therefore, the court held that Mangione could not be 
personally liable to Metromedia regardless of whether the jury found 
WCBM's conduct to be tortious.48 In an unreported opinion, the 
court of special appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Man-
gione.49 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Metromedia's 
petition for writ of certiorari. so 
The court of appeals reversed the decisions of the lower courts. 
The court of appeals held that if Metromedia could prove that (1) 
WCBM wrongfully retained possession of the premises, and (2) it 
was Mangione's decision as chief executive officer of WCBM not to 
vacate the premises, then the jury could justifiably return a verdict 
against Mangione personally for damages. 51 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The common misperceptions about the individual tort liability 
of corporate officials can be potentially disastrous. This is especially 
true in the area of ejectment, which is not commonly thought of as 
a tort. The "corporate shield" does not insulate corporate officers 
and directors from liability for their own tortious conduct. Lawyers 
should be careful not to let these officials be lulled into a false sense 
of security. 
48.Id. 
49. Id. at 518, 610 A.2d at 793. 
SO.Id. 
51. Id. at 522, 610 A.2d at 795. 
